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It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss the moral and
ethical aspects of divorce, concerning which little need be said to
the members of this Congress, but rather to give a brief his-
torical summary of divorce legislation in the United States, to-
gether with an analysis of the causes, social and sociological, that
have tended to differentiate such legislation and public sentiment
from that existing in England and other countries.
The facts and conclusions given are largely derived from three
sources, all recognized authorities in the United States:
i. Report on Marriage and Divorce. By Carroll D. Wright,
United States Commissioner of Labor.
2. History of Matrimonial Institutions. By George E.
Howard, Ph.D., of Chicago University.
3. Bishop on Marriage, Separation and Divorce.
Divorce legislation in the United States may be divided roughly
into three periods: First, the Colonial, lasting to the Revolution
of 1776; second, early State Legislation, coming down to the
Civil War of 1861, which may be called the formative and crystal-
lizing period; and third, that of the last fifty years, which has
been sometimes radical and expansive, sometimes conservative
and reactionary, according to the trend of social, economic and
religious influences in each State and decade.
I.
In colonial times, from 1620 to 178o, we find an important dis-
tinction between the New England, the Middle, and the Southern
colonies, both as to marriage and divorce; and since the two are
so vitally connected it may be interesting to touch briefly upon
the marriage, as well as the divorce situation.
In New England colonies the Puritan spirit of revolt against
ecclesiasticism, fostered by contact with the Dutch, expressed
itself in two ways as affecting the marital relation: First, by
I An address prepared for the Pan-Anglican Congress at London,
June 14-21, I9o8, by C. LaRue Munson, Chancellor of the Diocese of
Harrisburg and Vice-President of the National Divorce Congress, and by
William D. Crocker, Special Secretary of. the National Divorce Congress.
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forbidding the marriage ceremony to be performed by clergy-
men, thereby making it purely a matter of civil jurisdiction,
(though about I7oo, the law was modified so as to permit clergy-
men to officiate); second, by relegating the subject of divorce
exclusively to the civil authorities, either judicial or legislative;
the former method generally prevailing in Massachusetts and
Connecticut, the latter in Rhode Island. In every instance a
liberal policy respecting divorce was adopted, whether by statute,
or judicial decree; and "canonical separation," or divorce a
mensa et thoro, was practically abandoned.
The Middle colonies were more conservative. In "New
Netherland," later "New York," the doctrines of the Reforma-
tion prevailed, and the courts alone exercised divorce jurisdiction.
After the English acquired control, the province became subject
to the English common law, and judicial divorce a vincido ceased
with the English conquest, so that for more than one hundred
years preceding the Revolution, no divorce took place in the
colony of New York; and for many years after it became an
independent State there was not any lawful mode of dissolving
a marriage in the lifetime of the parties except by a special act
of the legislature. Under the Dutch regime, marriages had to
be solemnized by a minister with religious rites, but by the Duke
of York's code both religious and civil celebration of marriage
was permitted.
New Jersey was in the same position as New York under the
English rule. Civil marriage was recognized; divorces coul'd be,
obtained only through the legislature.
In Pennsylvania, both civil and religious celebrations of mar-
riage were recognized, and the early laws permitted absolute
divorce (by the courts) for the scriptural cause. Such divorces
were also granted by the legislature. But, both in Pennsylvania
and Delaware, the influence of the Quakers tended to restrain the
granting of divorces, and in the main family life "was placid and
prosaic."
In the Southern colonies we find in Virginia that the religious
marriage ceremony was prescribed by law, and civil celebration
was not authorized until after the Revolution. In Maryland, the
civil ceremony was optional until 1692, when it was forbidden to
members of the Church of England, and in 1777 it was entirely
abolished. In North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia
either mode of celebration was permitted from the first, although
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various attempts were made to abolish the civil ceremony,
"apparently to give the clergy a monopoly of the marriage fees."
In the Southern colonies we find a curious anomaly relating to
divorce. They were largely settled by English colonists, who,
under the decisions of the courts, brought the laws of the mother
country with them. But the law of England permitted only a
separation from "bed and board" by decree of an ecclesiastical
court. Absolute divorce was not recognized. While "however,
the colonists carried with them the English law, they did not
bring likewise the English courts." Therefore, "such laws could
be administered only as far and as fast as proper tribunals were
established." Jurisdiction in divorce was never conferred by
these colonies upon any tribunal, nor is there any instance of
legislative divorces until after the Revolution of 1776. Informal
separations, however, were frequent; and the Equity Courts took
cognizance of separate suits for alimony, contrary to the English
practice, where alimony was only an incident to divorce by
decree of the ecclesiastical court.
In passing, it should be stated that owing to the sparse settle-
ment of the colonies, to the difficulty of access to a clergyman,
or even to a civil magistrate, instances of marriage by "mutual
consent" were very frequent in colonial times. These marriages
later received judicial recognition under the name of "common
law marriages," which were divided into two classes: Marriages
per verba de presenti, and marriages per verba de futuro, fol-
lowed by subsequent cohabitation and common reputation as hus-
band and wife. Such marriages have been a source of much
vexatious litigation, both in the Divorce and Probate Courts;
but by recent legislation, looking to publicity and registration of
marriages, they have been abolished in nearly one-half of the
States of the Union.
II.
EARLY STATE LEGISLATION.
The foundations of the marriage laws of the several States of
the Union were laid during the Colonial period. Subsequent
legislation has been along lines relating to the forms of celebra-
tion and modes of registration. Civil and religious celebrations
are now everywhere optional except in two States, Maryland
and West Virginia. Nearly every State requires a marriage
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license, and provides for a more or less strict method of registra-
tion; and as stated above, "common law marriages" have been
abolished in nearly one-half of the States.
In the matter of divorce, from 178o to i86o, there are several
features worthy of notice.
First and foremost, is the fact that the Constitution of the
United States confers upon Congress no power of legislation
concerning either marriage or divorce, which are matters per-
taining to the domestic economy of each State. Therefore, a
uniform Federal law upon the subject could not be secured with-
out first amending the Constitution.
Second, the early State Constitutions were nearly all silent as
to jurisdiction over divorce; consequently the power of granting
divorces was left in the hands of the legislative bodies, and
nearly every State, new as well as old, has at some time granted
divorces through its legislature. Gradually, however, jurisdic-
tion in divorce was conferred upon the courts, although the legis-
latures still continued to grant divorces by special acts; and finally
nearly every State, either by constitutional or legislative pro-
vision, has vested such jurisdiction exclusively in the courts.
South Carolina, however, has no divorce statute whatever, neither
absolute nor limited divorces being permitted; although mar-
riages may be annulled for various ante-nuptial causes.
Third, there arose great diversity in the various States both as
to kinds and causes of divorce. While in England, prior to the
Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857, an absolute divorce could be
obtained only by act of Parliament, every one of the United States
(except South Carolina), following the colonial policies, permits
absolute divorce for one or more causes. On the other hand,
twenty-six of the forty-six States have abolished limited divorce,
apparently upon the naturalistic theory that "to be married and
not married" at one and the same time tends to foster immorality.
As to causes for divorce the policy of each State differs more
or less from that of every other. New York permits absolute
divorce for the scriptural cause alone. Other States have added
cruelty, personal abuse, desertion, conviction of crime, drunken-
ness, etc. Rhode Island permits the court to grant an absolute
divorce for "any act of either party repugnant to, and in viola-
tion of, the marriage covenant ;" and the State of Washington
permits such divorce for "any cause deemed by the court suffi-
cient, or when the court shall be satisfied that the parties can no
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longer live together." To the honor of the courts be it said,
that rarely have they based their decrees upon these "omnibus"
clauses.
The causes for limited divorce are practically the same as for
absolute divorce; and it should be added that while as a rule
the States which have retained limited divorce give alimony to
the wife in such proceedings, solely, yet those States which grant
only absolute divorce amply protect the wife and children by
separate provisions.
Fourth, at common law the domicile of the wife was always
presumed to be the same as that of her husband, and either
could obtain a divorce only in the forum of his domicile. This
rule was based, first, upon the legal fiction of the unity of person
of husband and wife; and second, upon the duty of the wife to
follow her husband. But as far back as the beginning of the
nineteenth century a new doctrine, which has come to be known
as the "American Rule" was formulated, and has become firmly
rooted in the jurisprudence of the United States. This rule may
be stated as follows: "For purposes of dizorcc, a wife may have
or acquire a domicile separate from that of her husband ;" and it
has been adopted and defended by the courts of every State.
chiefly upon the ground that "to compel the wife to follow the
guilty husband into his domicile for relief would be not only
unequal and unjust, but would in many cases be a practical
denial of justice." Political, economic and psychological reasons.
as well as the sentimental, underlie the adoption of the rule.
Political, because each State assumes and possesses the right of
control of the social status of its own citizens; economic, in that
the facility of removal by the husband from one jurisdiction to
another, (depending often only upon financial ability), would
otherwise place the wife at a great disadvantage; psychological.
because of the growing insistence of the theory that marriage is
purely a matter of contract, and not of social status. This theory
has been fostered in the minds of many by the almost universal
recognition of woman's individual rights of property, and of
her equality of opportunity in lines of employment common to
both sexes.
All of these reasons may be regarded as an illustration or
exponent of the spirit of individualism, which in matteirs, both
of Church and State, has obtained in the United States for nearly
three hundred years.
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There have, however, been important modifications of this
rule, both by the United States Supreme Court, and by the
higher courts of many of the States. In the former it is now the
law that "full faith and credit" will not be given to a decree of
divorce granted by the courts of any State unless such State
'had been the common matrimonial Idomicile of both parties, or
tiless the court had acquired jurisdiction over the defendant by
personal service within the State. In the State courts, decrees of
divorce granted by the courts of other States are recognized
only upon the grounds of "inter State contity." In other words,
if the decree granted by a foreign State is such as conforms in all
respects (both as to inception of jurisdiction, and orderly pro-
cedure in the cause), to the legal requirements and sense of jus-
tice of the State where the defendant resides, then, irrespective
of the "full faith and credit" clause, such foreign decree may be
recognized.
It will readily be seen that this American Rule has "brought
in its train as a logical result much inconvenience and uncertainty,
arising from the diverse effect given to divorce decrees outside
of the State which granted them, where such State never had or
never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant," and the malodo-
rous anomaly exists that a person may be divorced in one State
and married in one or all of the other States.
III.
This condition of affairs; the rapid increase in the number
of divorces for twenty years after the close of the Civil
War,-the number being ten thousand during the year 1867,
and twenty-five thousand during the year 1886, an increase
of 15o per cent, while during the same period the population
had increased but 6o per cent; and the latest statistics
indicate that the number of divorces per annum is now over
seventy thousand ;-together with the increased facilities for
divorce offered both by the loose legislation of many States
(some requi-ing a residence of only three or six months, and
some adopting the "omnibus" clauses above referred to), and by
the lax methods of procedure recognized by many courts, could
not fail to arouse the attention of all right-minded men and
women. As early as 1879, the American Bar Association
appointed a committee on Uniform State Laws, with instructions
to report, inter alia, upon the existing laws of Marriage and
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Divorce. The reports of this committee were interesting and
suggestive. Since 1892, many States have appointed commis-
sioners on Uniform Legislation, who act in harmony with the
committee of the Bar Association, and some progress has been
made in changes of legislation through their combined efforts.
Within the past ten years, two other social factors have taken
up the work of divorce reform. These are the National Divorce
Reform League, and the Inter-Church Conference on Marriage
and Divorce. The work of the former has been chiefly statistical
and educational. The latter body, composed of members, clerical
and lay, of fifleen different church organizations, the Rt. Rev.
William C. Doane, Bishop of Albany, being the chairman, has,
by written and oral appeals, stirred up an active interest in cor-
recting the evil of divorce, and aroused the public conscience to
a realization that stricter if not drastic methods must be adopted.
This Conference met at Washington in January, i9o5, and ap-
pealed to President Roosevelt to take some action. He sent a
special message to Congress expressing the hope that uniform
legislation on the subject might be in time adopted by the States,
and recommended that Congress provide for the collection of
reliable and trustworthy statistics relating to marriage and
divorce.
This message suggested to William C. Sproul, a member of the
Pennsylvania State Senate, the thought which was embodied in
an act passed by the Pennsylvania legislature in March, 1905,
wherein it is set forth as follows:
"WHEREAS. The constantly increasing number of divorces in
the United States has become recognized as an evil of threatening
magnitude, fraught with serious consequences to the well-being
of our institutions and civilization; and
WHEREAS, The diversity of legislative enactment in the several
Commonwealths composing the Union is, in the opinion of the
legal profession, of students of social science, and like investi-
gators, a serious obstacle in the way of the correction of this
evil; and
WHEREAS, The President of the United States has drawn the
attention of Congress to the necessity for uniformity in the
divorce laws in every part of the country; therefore :"-
It was provided that the Governor be authorized to appoint
three commissioners to examine and codify the laws of Penn-
sylvania relating to the subject of divorce, and to report the
results of their labors to the Governor for submission to the
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legislature. And further, the Governor was authorized to re-
quest the Governors of other States to co-operate in the assemb-
ling of a congress of delegates from such States at Washington
for the purpose of examining the laws and decisions of the
several States upon the subject of divorce. with a view to the
adoption of a draft for a proposed general law, which should be
reported to the Governors of all the States for submission to the
legislatures thereof, with the object of securing as nearly as
might be possible uniform statutes upon the matter of divorce
throughout the Nation.
Upon the passage of this act, the Governor of Pennsylvania.
the Honorable Samuel W. Pennypacker, appointed as Commis-
sioners on Divorce the three lawyers who were the State Com-
missioners on Uniform Legislation. This Commission in the
performance of its duties held nearly one hundred meetings;
prepared a printed compilation of the laws of every State upon
the subject of divorce; a codification of the existing laws of
Pennsylvania; a "Declaration of Principles," ethical *and legal,
underlying the problem of divorce; and indirectly, the question
of marriage, which was recognized as being at the root of all the
evils involved; and also an outline skeleton of a Uniform Divorce
Act, expressing in concrete form the abstract principles con-
tained in the above-mentioned "Declaration."
After completing their work the Commissioners reported to the
Governor, who then issued an invitation to the Governors of
every State to appoint delegates to attend a National Divorce
Congress, to be held at Washington in February, 19o6. At this
Congress,-unique in character as being the only gathering since
the Constitutional Convention of 1787, to which the delegates
brought the credentials of their respective Governors,-forty-two
out of forty-six States were represented.
After careful deliberation for three days the Congress adopted
seventeen basic resolutions, four of which relate to Jurisdiction,
one to Kinds of Divorce, five to Causes for Divorce, and seven
to Methods of Procedure.
It was the unanimous opinion of the one hundred delegates to
the Congress that no Federal divorce law was feasible, owing to
the practical difficulty of securing an amendment to the Consti-
tution of the United States, to accomplish which would require
the approval of two-thirds of the members of each branch of
Congress, and the subsequent ratification by the legislatures of
three-fourths of the States.
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The remaining three Jurisdictional Resolutions provided: That
bona fide residence of the plaintiff or the defendant should be a
condition precedent to bringing a suit in divorce; that no State
should grant relief to parties migrating from a sister State, unless
the cause of divorce was recognized in such other State; and
that the term of residence in the State where the suit is brought
should be at least two years.
The purpose of these Jurisdictional Resolutions was to strike
the axe at the root of migratory, hasty, collusive and fraudulent
divorces, and to check the swelling tide of divorces granted to
persons who could not obtain such relief in their own State.
A resolution was also adopted in favor of "limited" as well as
"absolute" divorces. This was a return to the present English
rule; and, aside from the fact that the consciences of many are
opposed to absolute divorce, an opportunity for reconciliation is
thereby afforded.
The five resolutions relating to Causes for Annulment of Mar-
riage and Divorce insist that they should be of so serious a char-
acter as to defeat the objects of the marital relation, should he
clearly defined by statute, and should be diminished rather than
increased.
The five or six generally accepted Causes for Annulment of
Marriage, Divorce a Vinculo, and Divorce a Mensa. were
enumerated. It was further provided that when conviction for
crime is a cause for divorce, it must have been the result of a
trial by jury, and be followed by at least two years' imprisonment.
Post-nuptial insanity was rejected as a cause for'absolute divorce;
and desertion should not be recognized as a cause for divorce
unless wilful, and persisted in for at least two years.
As to matters of legal procedure, it was recommended that
every defendant should be given full and fair opportunity by
actual notice to have his day in court, so as to prevent secret and
fraudulent divorces; that a party named as co-respondent should
be given an opportunity to intervene; that the system of obtain-
ing secret divorces by proceedings before a master or referee
should be abolished, and all hearings be had before the court;
that in all uncontested divorce cases a disinterested attorney
should be appointed by the court actively to defend the case; that
no decree should be granted unless the cause is shown by affirma-
tive proof aside from any admissions on the part of the defend-
ant; that neither party should be allowed to remarry until after
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the lapse of at least one year after the preliminary decree; that
the legitimacy of children of any marriage should not be affected
by any decree in divorce unless their illegitimacy be clearly
proven; and that no divorce granted by any State should be
recognized where the applicant, being a citizen of one State, goes
to another State for the purpose of obtaining a divorce.
These resolutions were referred to a committee with instruc-
tions to draft a Uniform Divorce Code. Such a Code was sub-
mitted to an adjourned meeting of the Congress held at Philadel-
phia in November, 19o6, and was, with a few changes, unani-
mously adopted.
This Code was confined to the following subjects:
i. Causes for annulment of marriage.
a. Impotency, etc.
b. Consanguinity, etc.
c. Former existing marriage.
d. Fraud, force, etc.
e. Ante-nuptial insanity.
f. Non-age of husband (18 years), and non-age of
wife (16 years).
2. Kinds of divorce.
a. From the bonds of matrimony, or absolute divorce.
b. From bed and board, or limited divorce.
3. Causes for absolute divorce.
a. Adultery.
b. Bigamy.
c. Conviction and sentence for crime.
d. Extreme cruelty.
c. Wilful desertion for two years.
f. Habitual drunkenness for two years.
4. Causes for limited divorce.
a. Adultery.
b. Bigamy.
c. Conviction and sentence for crime.
d. Extreme cruelty
e. Wilful desertion for two years.
f. Habitual drunkenness for two years.
g. Hopeless insanity of husband.
5. Bars to relief, to tcit, collusion, connivance or condonation.
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6. When and how jurisdiction, either in annulment or
divorce proceedings may be obtained; to wit, by per-
sonal service upon the defendant within the State in
which the suit is brought, or by constructive service
(i. e., by publication), where the plaintiff had been a
bona fide resident, or had become a bona fide resident of
the State where suit is brought, for a prescribed period,
with the proviso that if the cause of action for which
suit is brought was not recognized in the State from
which the plaintiff had removed, then no relief should
be granted.
7. Anyone charged as a particeps criminis may be made a
party.
8. A requirement that all hearings should be before the
court in public.
9. A provision for the appointment by the court of an
attorney to defend, in uncontested cases.
io. Defining the nature of proof to be required.
ii. Forbidding the impounding of records and evidence in
any case.
12. Requiring the first decree in* actions of annulment, or for
absolute divorce, to be conditional; i. e., a decree nisi.
13. That such decrees nisi should not become absolute until
after the expiration of one year from the entry thereof,
thereby prohibiting divorces for the mere purpose of
marriage with another party.
14. That decrees for limited divorce should be open to a
possible reconciliation, under the control of the court.
15. That the legitimacy of the children of any marriage
should not be affected by any decree in divorce, unless
their illegitimacy be clearly proven.
16. That the decrees of other States should not be recognized
unless obtained in conformity with the conditions as to
inception of jurisdiction, service of process, etc., as
prescribed by the act.
17. That if the inhabitant of any State should remove to
another State in order to obtain a divorce for a cause
which is not ground for divorce under the laws of the
former State. such decree should be of no force or effect
in the original State.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
The most important of these provisions were those relating to
jurisdiction in divorce, and the service of process upon a defend-
ant; to the effect to be given to the decrees of other States, and
of foreign countries; to forbidding any evasion of the laws of
the State of one's domicile by removal to another State to obtain
a divorce for a cause not recognized in the former; and to the
adoption of the decree nisi, following the English practice, and
that of several of the States.
This Code, with appropriate procedure clauses added, was
adopted last year by two States, New Jersey and Delaware. The
Pennsylvania State Senate passed the bill, but it failed of passage
in the Lower House. It will, however, be introduced again next
year, with the recommendation of the Pennsylvania State Bar
Association.
The Conference of State Commissioners on Uniform Legisla-
tion at its last meeting in August, I9O7, unanimously endorsed
the act, and the legislatures of several States are considering its
adoption. Legislative bodies move slowly, and it is no easy task
to educate public opinion in matters requiring a radical change
in well-established customs and practice.
While modern tendencies are rather destructive than con-
structive, and are apt to reject all authority, whether of religion
or of political and social precedent, we cannot be too conservative
of the institution of marriage. Lax divorce laws are a menace
to family life and all that makes it sacred. But the great interest
evinced by the members of the National Divorce Congress in the
work for which they were convened, gives cause for hope that
each year will find State after State adopting this proposed Code,
which expresses the best thought and earnest conviction of many
able minds.
C. LaRue Munson.
William D. Crockcr.
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